European Union regulation: | |
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 | |
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Council Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters | |
Made by | Council |
Made under | Article 61(c) and Article 67(1) TEC |
Journal reference | |
History | |
Made | 22 December 2000 |
Came into force | 1 March 2002 |
Preparative texts | |
Other legislation | |
Status: Current legislation |
The Brussels Regime is a set of rules regulating which courts have jurisdiction in legal disputes of a civil or commercial nature between individuals resident in different member states of the European Union and the European Free Trade Association. It has detailed rules assigning jurisdiction for the dispute to be heard and governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements.
Contents |
The Brussels Regime consists of the Brussels Convention, the Lugano Convention, and the Brussels I Regulation.
All three legal instruments are broadly similar in content, but there are some differences. In general, it is the domicile of the defendant that determines which of these instruments applies in a given case. The Brussels I Regulation is applicable where the defendant is domiciled in a member state of the European Union. Until 1 July 2007 this did not include Denmark — however an agreement was made between Denmark and the European Community extending the provisions of the regulation to Denmark.[3] The Lugano Convention is applicable when the defendant is domiciled in Iceland, Norway, or Switzerland. Where the recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgement is concerned, the applicable instrument is determined in analogous fashion by the country of origin of the judgement.
The Brussels Regime covers legal disputes of a civil or commercial nature (article 1). There are some exceptions limiting the scope of this; where the principal matter of a dispute is one of family law, bankruptcy or insolvency, social security, or relates to arbitration, the case is not subject to the rules.
Article 2 prescribes that a person (legal or natural) may only be sued in the member state in which he or she is domiciled. Domicile is determined by the law of the national court hearing the case, so that a person can be domiciled in more than one state simultaneously.
Article 4 preserves the traditional rules for defendants who are not domiciled in a member state. That is, if a defendant is domiciled elsewhere, then the Regime does not apply and the national court hearing the case is left to determine jurisdiction based on the traditional rules otherwise governing such questions in their legal system. Article 4 also allows a person domiciled in any member state to take advantage of another member state's exorbitant bases of jurisdiction on the same basis as a national of that state. This is useful in cases where a member state, such as France, allows its nationals to sue anyone in their courts, so that someone domiciled in a member state like Finland may sue someone domiciled in a non-member state like Canada, in the courts of a third party member state, like France, where the defendant may have assets.
The Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation are both subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on questions of interpretation. The Lugano Convention lacks a protocol governing references to the ECJ. Although the interpretations of other national courts, and of the ECJ in the case of Lugano Convention contracting states, are influential, they are not binding, and so various divergences have arisen between member states in the interpretation of the instruments.
It is also to be noted that the Brussels Regime generally allows jurisdiction clauses, which preserves the right of parties to reach agreement at the time of contracting as to which court should govern any dispute.
The Regime applies only in the courts of signatory states, so there is nothing to prevent a non-party state from allowing parallel proceedings in their courts, although this may contribute to a finding of forum non conveniens, which would in practice halt an action.